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O P I N I ON

ROTH, Circuit Judge:
Patricia Jennings-Fowler appeals the dismissal of three of her claims, the entry of
summary judgment on one claim, and the denial of leave to further amend her Complaint.
We will reverse the grant of summary judgment on the due process claim and the order,
dismissing her retaliation claim. We will affirm the District Court in all other regards.
I.
Jennings-Fowler worked for the City of Scranton for over fifteen years, as a
Housing Inspector for ten years. During this time, she openly supported Mayor
Doherty’s opponents, complained about sex discrimination, and filed a charge with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). She was subsequently placed
under video surveillance. Thereafter, the City presented Jennings-Fowler with a Notice
of Charges and called her into a termination meeting on September 25, 2013. At that
meeting, Jennings-Fowler was given a corrected Notice of Charges and suspended



This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
2

without pay. She was eventually terminated on October 2, 2013.
On May 20, 2014, Jennings-Fowler filed suit against the City, Mayor Doherty in
his capacity as mayor, and an “Unknown Decision Maker.” Her Second Amended
Complaint contains five causes of action: (1) violation of her due process rights for
insufficient pretermination process (Due Process Claim), (2) retaliation for her political
activities (Political Retaliation Claim), (3) violation of her equal protection rights through
selective video surveillance (Equal Protection Claim), (4) gender discrimination and
hostile work environment claims (Gender Discrimination Claims), and (5) retaliation for
filing a charge with the EEOC (Gender Retaliation Claim).
Defendants moved to dismiss all causes of action against Mayor Doherty1 and the
Equal Protection Claim and the Gender Discrimination Claims against the City. On
December 29, 2014, the District Court granted all the defendants’ motions and dismissed
both Retaliation Claims sua sponte. Jennings-Fowler filed a Motion for Reconsideration
and a Motion for Leave to file a Third Amended Complaint, both of which were denied
on July 2, 2015. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on Jennings-Fowler’s
Due Process Claim against the City, which the District Court granted on January 12,
2016. This appeal, which seeks review of all of the district judge’s dispositive rulings
except for dismissal of the Political Retaliation Claim and of defendant Doherty,

1

Jennings-Fowler does not explicitly appeal the dismissal of claims against Mayor
Doherty or allege separate claims against the Unknown Decision Maker. We only
discuss claims against the City, but note that the sufficiency of the allegations does not
depend on the identity of the defendant, except where otherwise specified.
3

followed.2
II.3
We exercise plenary review over a dismissal pursuant to 12(b)(6), as well as over
a grant of summary judgment, and make all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.4
A.
Jennings-Fowler challenges the grant of summary judgment on her Due Process
Claim, alleging insufficient pretermination process.
Jennings-Fowler first claims that she received insufficient notice because of errors
in the first Notice of Charges. This was remedied, however, by the provision of a
corrected Notice of Charges at the beginning of the termination meeting.5
We agree with Jennings-Fowler, however, that the content of the corrected Notice
of Charges was also deficient. Jennings-Fowler was entitled to “oral or written notice of
the charges against h[er], an explanation of the employer’s evidence, and an opportunity

2

Jennings-Fowler appeals the denial of her motion for reconsideration of dismissal of her
claims, which is generally reviewed for abuse of discretion. We will not address the
denial of reconsideration because Jennings-Fowler also appeals the dismissal of her
claims, which we review under the more favorable de novo standard.
3
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and exercised supplemental
jurisdiction over the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA) claims. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
4
See Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 163 (3d Cir. 2013) (dismissal
pursuant to 12(b)(6)); Nat’l Amusements Inc. v. Borough of Palmyra, 716 F.3d 57, 62 (3d
Cir. 2013) (summary judgment).
5
Jennings-Fowler does not argue that the timing of the corrected Notice of Charges left
her no time to prepare for the termination meeting. Even if she did, providing notice at
the start of a predeprivation hearing does not necessarily violate due process. Morton v.
Beyer, 822 F.2d 364, 369 (3d Cir. 1987) (noting the Supreme Court’s “continued
adherence to the view that advance notice is not a per se requirement of due process”).
4

to present h[er] side of the story”6 in connection with the termination meeting. Failure to
describe the nature of evidence supporting termination violates due process.7 Here, the
second and third charges did not provide the requisite description: both used boilerplate
language to accuse Jennings-Fowler of “[t]heft, willful destruction, willful defacement or
willful misuse of City Property[,]” and “[i]ntentionally falsifying or altering any City
record or report[.]” Further, Jennings-Fowler specifically asked whether any video or
photographic evidence existed to support these charges and was falsely told that it did
not. The use of boilerplate language in the charges, coupled with the defendants’ explicit
lie, denied Jennings-Fowler a sufficient explanation of the evidence against her.
Since it is sufficient that the charges that were the main focus of the termination
hearing failed to provide an explanation of the evidence against Jennings-Fowler,8 we
will reverse the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on this claim and remand it
for further proceedings.
B.
Jennings-Fowler appeals the District Court’s dismissal of her Equal Protection
Claim, premised on the defendants’ selective enforcement of a “secret surveillance”

6

Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985) (emphasis
added). See also Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 5 v. Tucker, 868 F.2d 74, 80 (3d
Cir. 1989) (“[A] sina qua non of a meaningful hearing is a sufficient explanation of the
employer’s evidence to permit a meaningful response.”).
7
See, e.g., Homar v. Gilbert, 89 F.3d 1009, 1018-19 (3d Cir. 1996), rev’d on other
grounds, 520 U.S. 924 (1997).
8
In Tucker, plaintiffs were accused of two infractions, one for which sufficient notice
was given and one for which it was not. 868 F.2d at 80. This Court vacated the district
court’s grant of summary judgment because one charge was insufficiently detailed, even
though the plaintiffs were not terminated for that charge per se.
5

program against her.
A selective enforcement claim under the 14th Amendment lies where a facially
valid law is enforced in a discriminatory way.9 A factual predicate of any selective
enforcement claim is the existence of a law, rule, or policy. The District Court found that
such a policy did not exist,10 and we agree. While alleged facts must be accepted as true
at this stage even if “unrealistic or nonsensical,”11 no facts are alleged to establish that
surveillance was a nondiscretionary policy or rule by defendants. Thus, we will affirm
the District Court’s dismissal of this claim.
C.
Jennings-Fowler appeals the dismissal of her sex discrimination claims under Title
VII, the Pennsylvania Human Resources Act (PHRA), and Section 1983. Since the
courts interpret PHRA claims coextensively with Title VII claims,12 we will address these
together before turning to the Section 1983 claims.
1.
To establish a hostile work environment under Title VII and the PHRA, a plaintiff
must allege, inter alia, that the discrimination faced was severe or pervasive as

9

Hill v. City of Scranton, 411 F.3d 118, 125 (3d Cir. 2005).
Jennings-Fowler v. City of Scranton, No. 14-0969, 2014 WL 7384748, at *5 (M.D. Pa.
Dec. 29, 2014), reconsideration denied, 2015 WL 4066946 (M.D. Pa. July 2, 2015).
11
Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 789 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009)).
12
See Atkinson v. LaFayette Coll., 460 F.3d 447, 454 n.6 (3d Cir. 2006); Winkler v.
Progressive Bus. Publications, No. 16-938, 2016 WL 4141152, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 4,
2016).
10
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determined by the totality of the circumstances. 13 Relevant factors in this determination
include “the frequency of the . . . conduct; its severity; whether it is physically
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably
interferes with an employee’s work performance.”14 Jennings-Fowler claims that a male
coworker, Shelly Roberts, slammed photos on her desk and demanded that she explain a
work decision; complained that she was at an inspection even though she was supposed
to be there; asked her to redo her work, even though it was better than that of her male
counterparts; and disparaged her in front of her peers and the public. These incidents,
while annoying and possibly embarrassing, do not rise to the level of humiliating or
threatening, and did not unreasonably interfere with Jennings-Fowler’s job.
Jennings-Fowler’s disparate treatment claim similarly fails. The prima facie case
for sex discrimination requires Jennings-Fowler to show, inter alia, that she suffered an
adverse employment action.15 Although Jennings-Fowler does not explicitly allege any
adverse employment action, her Complaint can be read to allege constructive discharge.16
The degree of harassment necessary to prove constructive discharge is greater than the
minimum needed to prove a hostile work environment.17 Because the conduct alleged is

13

Mandel, 706 F.3d at 167-68.
Id. at 168 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
15
Shramban v. Aetna, 262 F. Supp. 2d 531, 538 (E.D. Pa. 2003), aff’d, 115 F. App’x 578
(3d Cir. 2004).
16
Jennings-Fowler claims that her male co-workers “received preferential treatment since
they were not subject to Mr. Roberts’ harassment,” JA 58, and that “[d]espite
complaining, the [City] refused to remedy the hostile working environment.” JA 57.
17
Spencer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 469 F.3d 311, 316 n.4 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 968 F.2d 427, 430 (5th Cir. 1992), aff’d, 511 U.S. 244
(1994)).
14
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not sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute a hostile work environment claim, it also
falls short of a constructive discharge claim. For these reasons, the claims under Title
VII and the PHRA fail.
2.
Jennings-Fowler’s hostile work environment claim, pursuant to Section 1983, also
fails. Such a claim may only lie against a municipality if the injury was caused by
“execution of a government’s policy or custom.”18 Policy is made “when a
decisionmaker . . . issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict,” and custom involves
practices “so permanent and well settled as to virtually constitute law.” 19 JenningsFowler argues that the City’s actions constituted official policy and custom by “ma[king]
the official decision not to correct the harassment” and not providing gender
discrimination training. Neither allegation rises to the level of policy or custom. A
municipality may also be held liable due to the actions of a particular policymaker, when
a particular “policymaker is responsible either for the policy or, through acquiescence, for
the custom.”20 Here, Jennings-Fowler seems to allege that the Unknown Decision Maker
was a policymaker who acquiesced in Roberts’s harassment.21 Such acquiescence is only
actionable if “authorized policymakers approve a subordinate’s decision and the basis for
18

Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted), superseded in part by statute, Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1072; see also, Robinson v. City of Philadelphia,
No. 15-1574, 2015 WL 5965003 at *7 (E.D. Pa. October 13, 2015).
19
Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1480 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
20
Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1480.
21
Jennings-Fowler merely alleges that the Unknown Decision Maker is a policymaker;
however, identifying policymakers is a legal question for the court to decide. See Jett v.
Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989).
8

it.”22 Here, no facts suggest that the Unknown Decision Maker approved of Roberts’s
behavior and the sexually discriminatory basis for it.
Insofar as Jennings-Fowler alleges supervisory liability for her hostile work
environment claim, courts must determine whether the defendant had actual supervisory
authority over the harassing coworker.23 If so, the plaintiff must then establish the
defendant’s “personal direction or . . . actual knowledge and acquiescence” in the
harassment, which “must be pled . . . with appropriate specificity.” 24 Jennings-Fowler
fails to allege that either individual defendant had actual supervisory authority over
Shelly Roberts. Even assuming supervisory authority, Jennings-Fowler’s Complaint fails
to allege facts suggesting that defendants acquiesced in the harassment. In the absence of
any additional allegations, we decline to infer that the individual defendants participated
or acquiesced in Jennings-Fowler’s harassment. Thus, her sex discrimination claims
under Section 1983 fail as well.

22

Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1481 (internal quotations and citation omitted) (emphasis in
original); see also Albright v. City of Philadelphia., 399 F. Supp. 2d 575, 594 (E.D. Pa.
2005).
23
“[A defendant] can[not] be held liable under § 1983 for failing to take action to correct
the behavior of an individual over whom he had no actual control” and a higher-ranked
individual does not necessarily have supervisory authority over a lower-ranked employee.
Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1294 (3d Cir. 1997), abrogated on other
grounds by Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
24
Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1478 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We have
not reexamined this theory of Section 1983 liability in the wake of the Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009), but have noted that it may have been altered by that decision. See
Argueta v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60, 70 (3d Cir. 2011)
(“To date, we have refrained from answering the question of whether Iqbal eliminated—
or at least narrowed the scope of—supervisory liability . . ..”). We need not answer this
question here, however, as Jennings-Fowler’s claims fail for other reasons.
9

D.
Finally, Jennings-Fowler argues that the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of
her Gender Retaliation claim improperly deprived her of “notice of any vulnerability
contained in Count V [the Gender Retaliation Claim].” We agree. A court may sua
sponte dismiss a claim without affording the plaintiff notice and an opportunity to
respond but “[a]s a general proposition, sua sponte dismissal is inappropriate unless the
basis is apparent from the face of the complaint.”25
Jennings-Fowler’s Gender Retaliation Claim requires her to demonstrate that: (1)
she engaged in protected conduct, (2) her employer took adverse action against her, and
(3) a causal link exists between the protected conduct and the adverse action.26 JenningsFowler’s Complaint clearly satisfies the first two elements; only causality seems to be in
question. The temporal proximity of Jennings-Fowler’s protected activities and her
suspension and termination give rise to a sufficient inference of causality at this stage.27
Accordingly, we will reverse the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of JenningsFowler’s Gender Retaliation Claim, as it is not “patently meritless.”

25

Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 297 (3d Cir. 2002); accord Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192,
196 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that “a court may sua sponte raise the issue of the deficiency
of a pleading under Rule 12(b)(6) provided that the litigant has the opportunity to
address the issue either orally or in writing”) (emphasis added).
26
Connelly, 809 F.3d at 789.
27
See Lauren W. ex rel Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting
that a causal connection can be demonstrated by “an unusually suggestive temporal
proximity between the protected activity and the allegedly retaliatory action”); Mack v.
Yost, 427 F. App’x 70, 73 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding that a plaintiff had satisfied causality by
alleging that adverse action was taken a week after the exercise of protected conduct).
10

E.
Finally, Jennings-Fowler appeals the District Court’s decision to deny her Motion
for Leave to Amend. We review denial of leave to amend for abuse of discretion.28
Jennings-Fowler argues that the District Court erred in its finding of undue delay,
as she still had seven days to amend the Complaint under the Case Management Order.
Despite this, the decision to deny leave to amend was not an abuse of discretion. The
majority of the new facts alleged in the proposed Third Amended Complaint only support
claims which should have survived the motion to dismiss. To the extent that the Third
Amended Complaint contains facts alleging a new theory of sex discrimination, the
District Court properly denied leave because of Jennings-Fowler’s “repeated failure to
cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed.”29
For the above reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s decision to deny
Jennings-Fowler leave to file a Third Amended Complaint.
III.
Thus, we will reverse the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on
Jennings-Fowler’s Due Process Claim and sua sponte dismissal of Jennings-Fowler’s
Gender Retaliation Claim and remand for further proceedings. We will affirm the
District Court on all other counts.

28

In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997).
Cornell & Co., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 573 F.2d 820, 823
(3d Cir. 1978) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).
29
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